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A PROPOSED NARROWING OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT’S CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 
PROVISIONS: IT’S ONLY HUMAN? 
Brigid Harrington*
Abstract: The Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife is consider-
ing an amendment to the Clean Water Act (CWA) that would require 
human endangerment for a ªnding of criminal negligence under section 
309(c). This proposal is in reaction to United States v. Hanousek and United 
States v. Hong, seen by some as overly harsh punishment for mere “acci-
dents,” contrary to the intent behind the CWA. Others have defended the 
decisions, arguing that requiring human endangerment for section 
309(c) violations would unjustiªably excuse negligent conduct harmful to 
the environment and the public welfare. This Note reviews the criminal 
negligence standard under section 309(c), its application in Hanousek and 
Hong, and the major arguments proffered by the amendment’s propo-
nents and opponents. It concludes that the amendment is ill-advised, risk-
ing failure to capture signiªcant environmental harms and depriving 
prosecutors of leverage in plea-bargaining. 
Introduction 
 The year 2003 saw debate in the Senate Subcommittee on Fisher-
ies and Wildlife for the purpose of amending the Clean Water Act 
(CWA or the Act).1 The dominant proposed amendment would re-
quire that human endangerment be shown before criminal negligence 
for a violation of section 309(c) of the CWA could be found.2 The driv-
ing force behind this appears to be great concern among some regard-
ing two recent federal appeals court cases dealing with section 309(c), a 
CWA criminal negligence provision, which have been seen by some as 
contrary to the intentions of the negligence provisions in the Act and 
                                                                                                                      
* Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004–
05. 
1 See Oversight of the Clean Water Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and 
Water of the Senate Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 108th Cong. (2003), http://epw.senate.gov/ 
hearing_statements.cfm?id=212587 [hereinafter Oversight Hearing]. 
2 See id. (statement of Sen. James Inhofe; colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James 
Inhofe, and John Breaux). 
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as overly harsh punishment for mere “accidents.”3  Others, however, 
have argued that the decisions in these two cases, United States v. Ha-
nousek4 and United States v. Hong,5 were justiªed and did not represent a 
signiªcant departure from the traditional view of negligence under the 
CWA.6 These supporters further argue that amending section 309(c) to 
require human endangerment would unjustiªably excuse negligent 
conduct that could cause real harm to the environment and the public 
welfare. 7  This Note will explore these arguments by ªrst reviewing 
criminal negligence under section 309(c) of the CWA, its current ap-
plication in Hanousek and Hong, and the major points of each side’s ar-
guments. Finally, the Note concludes that the criminal negligence pro-
vision of section 309(c) should not be amended because section 309(c) 
ªts the deªnition of public welfare legislation, and any other standard 
risks failing to capture signiªcant environmental harms and deprives 
the system of prosecutorial discretion. Part I will explore the back-
ground of section 309(c) and the debate over whether violating it is a 
public welfare offense. Parts II and III will explain the decisions in Ha-
nousek and Hong as well as relevant criticisms of those decisions. Parts IV 
and V will outline the arguments for and against explicitly enacting a 
heightened standard of negligence under section 309(c), and will 
demonstrate why the current standard is preferable. 
I. The “Knowing” Provision of Section 309(c): Does a Violation 
Constitute a Public Welfare Offense? 
 Since before the decisions in Hanousek and Hong, there has been 
a split among the federal courts of appeals regarding the standard of 
intent required for a knowing violation of section 309(c), a criminal 
provision of the CWA.8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
held that a violation of section 309(c) does not constitute a public 
welfare offense (PWO), and that therefore in order to hold a defen-
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. (statement of Sen. Inhofe); id. (statement of Prof. Robin Greenwald). 
4 United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) [Hanousek I], cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1102 (2000) [Hanousek II]. 
5 United States v. Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001). 
6 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Robin Greenwald); Steven P. 
Solow & Ronald A. Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions Under the Federal Clean Water 
Act: A Statistical Analysis and Evaluation of the Impact of Hanousek and Hong, 32 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,153 (2002). 
7 Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Robin Greenwald); see Solow & 
Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,158. 
8 See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weitzen-
hoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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dant criminally liable for a “knowing” violation, it must be shown not 
only that his actions were intentional, but also that he was aware that 
they were unlawful.9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on 
the other hand, has held that a violation of section 309(c) is a PWO, 
and that therefore in order for a defendant to be held criminally li-
able for a “knowing” violation, it must be shown only that his actions 
were intentional, but not that he knew they were unlawful.10 In order 
to later describe the controversy surrounding the level of intent re-
quired for criminally negligent violations in Hanousek, it is crucial to 
ªrst understand the controversy over the standard of intent for know-
ing violations, and whether or not a violation of section 309(c) is a 
PWO.11 Accordingly, this Part will ªrst present the language of section 
309(c), then outline the Supreme Court’s deªnition of a PWO, and 
ªnally discuss the two court of appeals cases differing over whether a 
violation is a PWO. 
A. The Language of Section 309(c) 
 The Clean Water Act’s primary criminal enforcement provision, 
found in section 309(c), criminalizes both negligent and knowing vio-
lations of speciªed CWA provisions and permits relating thereto, as 
well as negligent or knowing activities that introduce pollutants into 
sewer systems and publicly owned treatment works.12 The inclusion of 
                                                                                                                      
9 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391. 
10 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284, 1286. 
11 See, e.g., Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284, 1286. 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). One who commits a negligent violation is one who: 
 (A) negligently violates [certain sections of the CWA], or any permit con-
dition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued un-
der [the CWA] . . . or 
 (B) negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned 
treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person rea-
sonably knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury 
or property damage or . . . which causes such treatment works to violate any 
efºuent limitation or condition in any permit issued [under the CWA] . . . . 
Id. § 1319(c)(1). One who commits a knowing violation is one who: 
 (A) knowingly violates [certain sections of the CWA], or any permit condi-
tion or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under 
[the CWA] . . . or 
 (B) knowingly introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned 
treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person 
knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury or prop-
erty damage or . . . which causes such treatment works to violate any efºuent 
limitation or condition in a permit issued [under the CWA] . . . . 
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negligent violations makes section 309(c) one of the few environ-
mental statutes that criminalizes negligence.13 Under section 309(c), 
both negligent and knowing violations are punishable by substantial 
ªnes, imprisonment, or both for ªrst offenses, and are subject to in-
creased monetary or incarceration penalties for subsequent offenses.14
B. “Knowing” Under Section 309(c) and PWOs 
 In interpreting the “knowing” provisions of section 309(c), courts 
have disagreed over the level of knowledge that an actor is required to 
have in order for his actions to be considered a violation, a determi-
nation that hinges on whether the violation is viewed as a PWO.15 
Courts that consider violations to be PWOs require less knowledge on 
the part of the actor when ªnding a violation; those that do not con-
sider violations to be PWOs require a showing that the violator’s act 
was knowingly unlawful.16
1. What Is a PWO? 
 The public welfare offense doctrine modiªes the traditional level 
of intent required both at common law and under conventional meth-
                                                                                                                      
Id. § 1319(c)(2). 
13 Id. § 1319(c); Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,153 n.3 (“The only other envi-
ronmental statute that contains a criminal negligence provision is the negligent endan-
germent provision of the CAA.”). 
14 Those who commit negligent violations: 
shall be punished by a ªne of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per 
day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a 
conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a ªrst conviction of 
such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a ªne of not more 
than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 2 
years, or by both. 
Id. § 1319(c)(1). Those who commit knowing violations: 
shall be punished by a ªne of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per 
day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If 
a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a ªrst conviction of 
such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a ªne of not more 
than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 
years, or by both. 
Id. § 1319(c)(2). 
15 See Hanousek II, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ahmad, 101 
F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284. 
16 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284. 
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ods of statutory construction.17  At common law and under conven-
tional statutory construction, a defendant must have conventional 
mens rea, which requires that he must not only be aware of and have 
intended his conduct, but must also be aware that this conduct was 
criminal or involved “some wrongdoing.”18 The courts, however, have 
designated certain crimes as PWOs.19 In these cases, a court interprets 
Congress as having intended that the level of required mens rea be 
lowered for a violation, and that the defendant is not required to know 
that his actions are criminal in order to be found liable for them.20 
Courts sometimes refer to such laws as public welfare statutes (PWSs).21
 In determining whether a criminal provision is a PWS, a court 
looks to the character of the subject regulated and the seriousness of 
the corresponding punishments for violations.22 Typically, a PWS in-
volves “conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to 
stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the commu-
nity’s health or safety” 23  or involves “dangerous or deleterious de-
vices.”24 The nature of the regulated activity or substance in such a 
statute is so potentially harmful that the defendant should know that 
its character puts him “in responsible relation to public danger,”25— 
that is, he should know from the nature of the item that there is a 
probability of strict regulation.26 For example, in United States v. Inter-
national Minerals and Chemical Corp. the Supreme Court found that 
regulation of the shipping of hazardous materials as applied to acids 
was a PWS because the materials regulated were “dangerous or dele-
terious devices or products or obnoxious waste material [for which] 
the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that 
he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to 
be aware of the regulation.”27 Similarly, in United States v. Balint and in 
United States v. Freed, the Court found regulations of the sale of narcot-
                                                                                                                      
17 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–07 (1994). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 606; see United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 
(1971); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 
250, 254 (1922). 
20 Staples, 511 U.S. at 606; Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564; Freed, 401 U.S. at 609; Balint, 
258 U.S. at 252–53. 
21 See Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999). 
22 Staples, 511 U.S. at 607, 616. 
23 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985). 
24 Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. 
25 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). 
26 Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565. 
27 Id. 
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ics and regulations of hand grenades, respectively, to be PWSs because 
the materials that they regulated were so inherently hazardous that 
anyone in possession of them should be expected to be on notice that 
they were regulated.28
 Dangerousness of the item alone, however, is not enough to 
make a regulation a PWS.29 If the item is dangerous but also “com-
monplace and generally available,” it may not be of a nature that 
would alert individuals to the probability of strict regulation.30 For 
example, in Staples v. United States, the Court found that although guns 
are potentially harmful and dangerous, the fact that gun ownership is 
common in the United States and can be a perfectly innocent activity 
meant that the regulation of guns was not a PWS.31Moreover, regula-
tions dealing with items that are not inherently dangerous are not 
PWSs.32 In Liparota v. United States, the Court found that a statute gov-
erning the illegal transfer of food stamps was not a PWS because food 
stamps are not inherently dangerous, and the holder of food stamps 
should not be expected to be aware of speciªc regulation pertaining 
to their transfer.33
 Finally, the Court considers the severity of punishments for viola-
tions of the regulation when determining whether or not the regula-
tion is a PWS.34 While there is no bright-line rule as to what kinds of 
punishments might correspond to PWSs, the Court has noted that the 
ªrst PWSs involved only small ªnancial penalties or short sentences in 
jail, and never imprisonment in the state penitentiary.35 In Staples, the 
Court found that a statute whose penalty included up to ten years in 
prison was not intended to be a PWS, partly because of the substantial 
severity of the available punishment.36
 The ªnal aspect of PWO analysis that is relevant here is that the 
Court has suggested—but has not held—that, under the PWO doc-
trine, a person might be found liable for a PWO by committing an act 
                                                                                                                      
28 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971); see United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 
250, 254 (1922). 
29 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611 (1994). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 610. 
32 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
33 Id. at 432–33. 
34 Staples, 511 U.S. at 616. 
35 Id. at 616, 618. 
36 Id. at 616. 
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of ordinary negligence.37 In United States v. Balint, the Court cited sev-
eral examples of conduct that could be considered PWOs, including 
one example of criminal negligence: 
[W]here one deals with others and his mere negligence may 
be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, 
the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, 
require the punishment of the negligent person though he 
be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.38
 The Court also explained the policy behind PWOs in terms of 
negligence in United States v. Dotterweich 39  and Morissette v. United 
States.40 In Dotterweich, the Court stated that public welfare legislation 
“puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise inno-
cent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”41 In 
Morissette, it stated that, in PWOs, “the accused, if he does not will the 
violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than 
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might 
reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities,” and fur-
ther that the purpose of PWOs was “‘to require a degree of diligence 
for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossi-
ble.’”42 Thus, the Court has described PWO policy in terms of requir-
ing reasonable care, and has cited examples of negligence that might 
constitute a PWO.43 However, none of these cases in which the Court 
analogized negligence to a PWO has involved the prosecution of an 
explicitly negligent action under a PWO.44
                                                                                                                      
37 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Dotterweich, 
320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252–53 (1922); Hanousek I, 
176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999). 
38 Balint, 258 U.S. at 252–53. 
39 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281. 
40 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
41 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281. 
42 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256, 257 (quoting People v. Roby, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (Mich. 
1884)). 
43 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281; United States v. Balint, 258 
U.S. 250, 252–53 (1922). 
44 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248 (involving the knowing conversion of government prop-
erty); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278 (involving a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act for knowingly shipping misbranded and adulterated drugs); Balint, 258 U.S. 
at 251 (involving the knowing sale of narcotics). 
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2. The Fifth Circuit: Knowing Violations of Section 309(c) Are Not 
PWOs 
 In United States v. Ahmad, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that “knowing” violations of section 309(c) are not PWOs, 
and therefore section 309(c)(2)(A) requires “knowledge as to each 
[element of the offense] rather than only one or two.”45 Following 
Staples, the court in Ahmad focused on whether “‘dispensing with mens 
rea would require the defendant to have knowledge only of tradition-
ally lawful conduct,’”46 and held that discharging in violation of sec-
tions 301 and 309(c)(3), thereby triggering the criminal provision of 
section 309(c), might reasonably be perceived as traditionally lawful 
conduct if the discharger did not know the nature of the substance he 
was discharging.47 The court reasoned, “[O]ne who honestly and rea-
sonably believes he is discharging water may ªnd himself guilty of a 
felony if the substance turns out to be something else.”48 Thus, be-
cause a defendant might not know that the substance he is dealing 
with is inherently hazardous, he cannot be expected to know that it is 
strictly regulated, and thus section 309(c) cannot be a PWS.49 The 
court also noted that violations of the CWA were punishable by 
signiªcant prison time, indicating that it was not PWS.50 Therefore, 
because knowing violations are not PWOs, a defendant in the Fifth 
Circuit must act intentionally, knowing the nature of his acts and also 
knowing that these acts violate a criminal provision, in order to be 
found guilty of a section 309(c)(2) violation.51
3. The Ninth Circuit: Knowing Violations of Section 309(c) Are PWOs 
 In United States v. Weitzenhoff, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit followed the reasoning of International Minerals and Staples to 
determine that violations of the “knowing” provision of section 309(c) 
were PWOs.52 In Weitzenhoff, the defendant knowingly discharged in 
violation of a permit issued under the CWA, but argued that this was 
                                                                                                                      
45 United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1996). 
46 Id. at 391 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. Under section 309(c) violators may be punished by up to one year in prison if it 
is their ªrst offense, and up to two years if it is their second. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) 
(2000). 
51 See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391. 
52 United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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not a criminal violation under section 309(c)(2) because he did not 
know the discharge violated his permit or the statute.53 Like the mate-
rial regulated in International Minerals, the court held that the material 
regulated by the CWA in Weitzenhoff was “‘dangerous or deleterious,’” 
such that “‘the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is 
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be 
presumed to be aware of the regulation.’”54 The material regulated by 
the CWA in Weitzenhoff was distinguished from the material regulated by 
gun control statutes in Staples.55 The court noted that the Staples Court 
distinguished guns from “obnoxious waste material,” regulation of 
which would be considered a PWS.56 Thus, the court in Weitzenhoff held 
that the CWA is more similar to the regulations in International Minerals 
because “the criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to 
protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of 
water pollution,” and the object of regulation was not generally inno-
cent, but rather “obnoxious waste material.”57 Because the nature of 
the object of section 309(c) was “obnoxious,” “deleterious,” and not 
“commonplace,” and because section 309(c) was “to protect the public 
at large,” the court determined that the regulation was a PWS.58
II. United States v. Hanousek: Extending the Ninth Circuit’s 
Interpretation of Section 309(c) as a PWS to Negligent 
Violations 
 In United States v. Hanousek, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit extended the public welfare offense doctrine to include not 
only knowing violations but also negligent violations of section 309(c) 
of the CWA.59 The import of this decision is that ordinary negligence 
is enough to establish criminal liability under the CWA, at least in the 
Ninth Circuit.60 This broadening of the already controversial PWO 
doctrine to include negligent as well as knowing violations of the 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 1283. 
54 Id. at 1284 (quoting United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 
(1971)). 
55 Id. at 1286. 
56 Id. at 1285. 
57 See Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286. 
58 Id. 
59 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999). 
60 Id. 
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CWA has drawn criticism in the Senate, and is the major reason be-
hind the proposed amendment.61
A. The Hanousek Decision 
 In United States v. Hanousek, the court held that negligent viola-
tions of section 309(c) are PWOs, and therefore, in order to establish 
a violation under section 309(c)(1)—the “negligence” provision of 
section 309(c)—the government must prove only that the defendant 
acted with ordinary negligence, as opposed to the higher standard of 
criminal negligence.62 Hanousek, a roadmaster of the White Pass & 
Yukon Railroad running between Skagway, Alaska, and Whitehorse, 
Yukon Territory, Canada, was responsible for “every detail” of the 
“safe and efªcient” execution of a rock-quarrying project, the labor 
and equipment for which was provided by a contracting company.63 
After Hanousek took over responsibility for the project, the contract-
ing company under his supervision ceased taking measures to protect 
a petroleum pipeline running parallel to the tracks on which they 
were working.64 One day, an employee of the contracting company 
noticed that some rocks had caught the plow of the train, and had 
been deposited to the side of the tracks near the pipeline.65 He at-
tempted to use a backhoe to remove the rocks, striking the pipeline, 
which ruptured and spilled 1000 to 5000 gallons of heating oil into 
the Skagway River.66
 Hanousek was convicted of a “negligent” violation under section 
309(c)(1)(A), but argued on appeal that the jury should have been 
instructed that section 309(c)(1)(A) required a higher standard of 
“criminal negligence” as opposed to ordinary negligence.67 “Criminal 
negligence,” under Hanousek’s deªnition, is a signiªcant “deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation,” as opposed to ordinary negligence, which the district 
court deªned as “the failure to use reasonable care.”68 Hanousek ªrst 
argued that criminal negligence standards should apply because Con-
gress intended them to apply; alternatively, he argued that due process 
                                                                                                                      
61 See discussion infra Part IV. 
62 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1120, 1122. 
63 Id. at 1119. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1120. 
68 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1120. 
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insulated him from liability because, as a roadmaster, he did not know 
nor was he in a position to know what was required of him by the 
CWA.69
 In rejecting Hanousek’s argument that Congress intended a 
criminal negligence standard to apply, the court looked to the plain 
language of the statute.70 Since the statute did not deªne the word 
“negligently,” the court concluded that Congress intended it to have 
its ordinary meaning: “failure to use such care as a reasonably pru-
dent and careful person would use under similar circumstances.”71 
The court noted that Congress had prescribed explicitly heightened 
negligence standards in other sections of the Clean Water Act, such as 
section 311(b), which applies to owners or operators of oil vessels or 
facilities in spills.72 Since Congress provided for high negligence stan-
dards in some instances, but not in the CWA’s general criminal negli-
gence provision, the court concluded that Congress did not intend a 
higher standard of criminal negligence.73
 The court also rejected Hanousek’s argument that the applica-
tion of ordinary negligence violated his due process rights because he 
did not have notice of what was required of him under the CWA.74 
Instead, the court held that section 309(c) was a PWS, rendering such 
notice unnecessary.75
 In Hanousek, then, a court for the ªrst time extended the public 
welfare offense doctrine beyond mere knowing violations of the CWA 
to include negligent violations as well.76 In holding that a negligent 
violation could be a PWO, the court relied on dicta from United States 
v. Balint, Morissette v. United States, and United States v. Dotterweich, all of 
which suggested that negligence could constitute a PWO.77 The court 
stated that these cases “established that a public welfare statute may 
subject a person to criminal liability for his or her ordinary negli-
gence without violating due process.”78 Thus, because Hanousek was 
engaged in conduct where his mere negligence posed a danger to the 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. at 1120–21. 
70 Id. at 1120. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1121 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D)). 
73 Id. 
74 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1121–22. 
75 Id. at 1122. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.; see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); United States v. Dotter-
weich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252–53 (1922). 
78 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1121. 
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public at large—the supervision of a project and failure to instruct 
that the pipeline be protected—criminal sanctions could be applied 
even though he was unaware that his activity was proscribed.79 Fur-
thermore, he might be found criminally liable for his negligence be-
cause he could have prevented the harm that his negligence caused 
with no more care and exertion than might be expected of any other 
reasonable person who assumed his responsibilities. 80  Finally, the 
court put the burden to act upon Hanousek, not only because it was 
in the public’s interest to do so, but also because Hanousek should 
have been on notice that his activity was probably strictly regulated, 
given the dangerous nature of oil.81
 In holding that negligent violations could be PWOs, the court 
rejected Hanousek’s argument that he did not have the same kind of 
constructive notice as had the plaintiffs in Weitzenhoff who had ob-
tained a CWA permit and thus reasonably should have been aware 
that the regulation applied.82 The court stated that the difference be-
tween Hanousek and the defendants in Weitzenhoff was “a distinction 
without difference,” and that “‘as long as the defendant knows that he 
is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him “in 
responsible relation to a public danger,” he should be alerted to the 
probability of strict regulation.’”83 Because Hanousek knew that he 
was working close to a pipeline, he should have been alerted that his 
activity was likely regulated, making his negligence a PWO.84
 In sum, the Hanousek court reasoned that, because it is in the pub-
lic interest that people dealing with material or activities regulated un-
der a CWA criminal negligence provision be required to exercise due 
care, and because it is reasonable to expect people working with or 
around material regulated under the CWA to be on notice of probable 
regulation, criminal negligence under section 309(c) is a PWO.85 In 
order to violate section 309(c), then, a defendant is not required to 
know that his negligent activities violate the CWA; he must merely fail 
to exercise reasonable care.86
                                                                                                                      
79 See id. (citing Balint, 258 U.S. at 252–53). 
80 See id. (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256). 
81 See id. at 1122 (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281). 
82 Id.; see United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1994). 
83 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 
(1994) (in turn quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281)). 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 1121–22. 
86 See id. 
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B. Criticism of Hanousek 
 The decision in Hanousek has been criticized by academic observ-
ers, in Congress, and by two Supreme Court justices.87 The criticisms 
generally fall into two categories: criticisms of the view of CWA criminal 
provisions as public welfare legislation,88 and criticisms of the ordinary 
negligence standard imposed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.89 The criticisms address two sides of the same issue: if the CWA 
is not public welfare legislation, then necessarily a higher standard of 
knowledge than ordinary negligence would apply.90 Thus, under the 
critics’ preferred interpretations of the CWA, Hanousek would have 
needed a higher level of knowledge, either of the law that he was break-
ing, or of the potential that his actions could cause harm.91
1. Violations of Section 309(c) Should Not Be PWOs 
 Several commentators have argued that Hanousek is incorrect be-
cause negligent violations of the CWA should not be considered pub-
lic welfare offenses.92 If section 309(c) is not considered a PWS, Ha-
nousek would have had to have known that his negligent behavior was 
regulated before he could have been found to have violated it.93
 Perhaps the most notable criticism of Hanousek’s application of 
the public welfare offense doctrine appears in Justice Thomas’s dis-
sent, joined by Justice O’Connor, from the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari in that case.94 Justice Thomas argued that the CWA should 
not be considered a PWS because, although it does regulate some 
dangerous activities and substances, it also “imposes criminal liability 
for persons using standard equipment to engage in a broad range of 
                                                                                                                      
87 Hanousek II, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by O’Connor, 
J.), denying cert. to Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999); Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 
(statement of Sen. James Inhofe; colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James Inhofe, and 
John Breaux); Randall S. Abate & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All About What You Know: The 
Speciªc Intent Standard Should Govern “Knowing” Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 304, 336–38 (2001); Tanya White, Note, Taking Criminal Liability of Negligent 
Actors One Step Too Far, 7 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 104, 114 (2000). 
88 See Hanousek II, 528 U.S. at 1103 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Inhofe; colloquy among Sens. 
Domenici, Inhofe, and Breaux). 
90 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1122. 
91 See id.; Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (colloquy among Sens. Domenici, Inhofe, and 
Breaux); White, supra note 87, at 111. 
92 Hanousek II, 528 U.S. at 1102 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Abate & Mancuso, supra note 
87, at 336–38. 
93 See Hanousek II, 528 U.S. at 1102–03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 1103–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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ordinary industrial and commercial activities. This fact strongly mili-
tates against concluding that the public welfare doctrine applies.”95 
Justice Thomas cited Staples v. United States, where the Court held that 
dangerous items that are commonplace and readily available should 
not be regulated under the public welfare offense doctrine, and 
analogized such regulation of ordinary things to the regulation of or-
dinary industrial activities in the CWA. 96  Justice Thomas wrote, “I 
think we should be hesitant to expose countless numbers of construc-
tion workers and contractors to heightened criminal liability for using 
ordinary devices to engage in normal industrial operations.”97 Justice 
Thomas also noted the severity of the penalty imposed upon violators 
of the CWA, 98  and juxtaposed that with the Court’s statement in 
Morissette v. United States that, for PWOs, “penalties commonly are rela-
tively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s 
reputation.”99 He argued that the appeals court should have looked 
beyond whether a statute regulates a “conduct that is known to be 
subject to extensive regulation and that may involve a risk to the 
community” in determining whether it was a PWS.100 He also con-
tended that the court should have considered such factors as the or-
dinariness of the substance or activity regulated by the CWA as well as 
the severity of the resulting punishment for violations.101
 Commentators agreeing with Justice Thomas have expressed dis-
appointment that the majority did not grant certiorari in Hanousek.102 
For example, Ronald Abate and Dayna Mancuso state that the appli-
cation of the public welfare offense doctrine to negligent violations of 
the CWA extends the doctrine beyond its already erroneous applica-
tion, in their opinion, to knowing violations of the CWA.103
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 1103 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
96 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 611). 
97 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. at 1103–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Negligent violators of the CWA, such as Ed-
ward Hanousek, Jr., may be punished by imprisonment for up to one year or by a ªne of 
up to $25,000 per day of violation, or both. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2000); Hanousek I, 
176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). Repeat offenders may be subject to up to two years in 
prison, or a ªne of up to $50,000 per day of violation, or both. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). 
99 Hanousek II, 528 U.S. at 1104 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)). 
100 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 1103–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
102 Abate & Mancuso, supra note 87, at 339. 
103 Id. at 336–37. 
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2. Ordinary Negligence Should Not Be a Ground for Criminal Liability 
 Other arguments against the interpretation of section 309(c) by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hanousek assert that us-
ing ordinary negligence as a basis for criminal liability is illogical, ei-
ther because it has limited deterrent value due to its deviation from 
the standard of criminal negligence in other environmental statutes, 
or because it is fundamentally unfair.104
a. An Ordinary Negligence Standard Has Limited Deterrent Value 
 One argument against the application of ordinary negligence in 
situations like the one in Hanousek focuses on the actor’s inability to 
foresee the deleterious result.105 Because Hanousek could not have 
been expected to foresee the oil spill, there is no deterrent value in 
holding him criminally liable for his negligence, and such punish-
ment is thus harsh and unreasonable.106 Ordinarily, the logic behind 
holding some negligent actors criminally liable is that punishment of 
negligence will deter others from failing to exercise reasonable care, 
and that such deterrence will beneªt the society as a whole.107 Critics 
of ordinary negligence as a standard for criminal violations of section 
309(c) believe that these justiªcations do not apply to Hanousek be-
cause Hanousek’s actions represent accident more than a lack of fore-
sight or care, and so there is no deterrent value in punishing him.108 
They assert that Hanousek as a roadmaster could not have foreseen 
that rocks would be pushed into the train tracks, and that a backhoe 
operator of a contracting company he had hired would attempt to 
remove those rocks, accidentally puncturing an oil line in the proc-
ess.109 Hanousek’s supervision could not be said to have caused the 
rupture, because there was a superseding cause, the train, which Ha-
nousek could not have foreseen.110 In effect, this argument presumes 
                                                                                                                      
104 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James 
Inhofe, and John Breaux); Samara Johnston, Is Ordinary Negligence Enough to Be Criminal? 
Reconciling United States v. Hanousek with the Liability Limitation Provisions of the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, 12 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 263, 266 (1999–2000); White, supra note 87, at 111–13. 
105 White, supra note 87, at 111. 
106 Id. at 111–12. 
107 Id. at 111. 
108 Id. at 112. 
109 Id. at 111; see Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
110 White, supra note 87, at 112; see Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1119. 
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that Hanousek was not truly negligent, or that his negligence was in-
signiªcant.111
 Even if Hanousek’s supervision was in fact negligent, critics fur-
ther argue that, by imposing criminal liability, the court overstepped 
the bounds that the Supreme Court set in previous cases ªnding 
criminal liability for violations of PWOs.112 The dicta in Morissette, Ba-
lint, and Dotterweich, critics argue, do not compel a ªnding that ordi-
nary negligence should constitute a PWO, even if they do suggest that 
a violation of some higher standard of negligence could be a PWO.113 
Morissette, for example, stated that negligent actors may be found 
criminally liable if the negligent actor “is in a better position to pre-
vent the violation with no more care or exertion than would be rea-
sonably expected given his or her duties.” 114  Critics argue that a 
higher standard of negligence should apply in the case of negligent 
violations that are PWOs.115 Punishing ordinary negligence such as 
the conduct in Hanousek has little deterrent value because ordinary 
negligence involves less of a mental element than heightened stan-
dards of negligence such as recklessness or Hanousek’s “criminal neg-
ligence.” 116  Because Hanousek could not have foreseen the spill, 
there was no mental element to his crime, and punishment of such a 
“criminal” serves no societal purpose and instead deters qualiªed in-
dividuals from taking risky jobs.117
b. Criminalizing Ordinary Negligence Is Incongruent with Other Environmental 
Statutes 
 Other arguments that the decision in Hanousek was erroneous 
focus on the standard of negligence articulated in environmental and 
oil regulation statutes other than the CWA.118 The only environmental 
statute other than the CWA that contains a criminal negligence provi-
sion is the Clean Air Act (CAA).119 In order to violate the criminal 
negligence provision of the CAA, the offender’s negligent behavior 
                                                                                                                      
111 White, supra note 87, at 111–12. 
112 Id. at 112; see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
113 See Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1121; White, supra note 87, at 107, 112. 
114 White, supra note 87, at 112 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256). 
115 See id. at 113. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James 
Inhofe, and John Breaux); Johnston, supra note 104, at 266. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2000); see Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,153 n.3. 
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must “place[ ] another person in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily injury.”120 The requirement of imminent danger to a human 
being makes the negligence standard of the CAA higher than that of 
the CWA, and as a result, there have been very few prosecutions un-
der this CAA provision.121 In his statement in support of the proposed 
amendment to the CWA, Senator Inhofe used the CAA provision as 
an example of what he believed environmental criminal negligence 
should look like.122
 The criminal negligence provisions of the CWA also can be seen 
as incongruent with laws that might work simultaneously with it, 
speciªcally, the limited liability section of the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA).123 Samara Johnston points out that, while the OPA pro-
vides for limited liability in a spill caused by ordinary negligence, the 
CWA’s criminal negligence provisions have no such limitation, and 
thus unlimited liability could apply to the same spill under the 
CWA.124 However, to reconcile these provisions, Johnston asserts that 
ordinary negligence actually is an appropriate standard for criminal 
liability under the CWA because prosecutorial and judicial discretion 
can limit liability to an appropriate level in the case of an oil spill gov-
erned by both the CWA and the OPA.125 Nonetheless, this discrepancy 
between the statutes exists and could potentially result in unfair or 
disparate results in the case of a spill that violates both the CWA and 
the OPA.126 In the Oversight Hearing colloquy discussing the CWA, 
Senator Breaux of Louisiana pointed out that unlimited liability could 
                                                                                                                      
120 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4). 
121 See Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,153 n.3. 
122 Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Inhofe). Senator Inhofe stated: 
Unlike other environmental statutes—including the Clean Air Act—to be 
convicted of a negligent violation [of the CWA], a person does not have to be 
guilty of an intentional or a reckless act. The person—entirely by accident, 
without any forethought and without any malice or intent—may have caused 
a pollutant to spill into nearby waters and as a result could be sent to jail, 
convicted of a federal offense. 
Id. 
123 Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1004, 104 Stat. 484, 491 
(codiªed as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2000)); Johnston, supra note 104, at 282. 
124 Johnston, supra note 104, at 282; see OPA § 1004(a). The OPA provides for unlim-
ited liability in the presence of gross negligence or willful misconduct. OPA § 1004(c). 
125 See Johnston, supra note 104, at 310. 
126 Id. at 309–10. 
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attach to oil spills, and used this as the basis for his position in favor of 
amending the CWA.127
c. An Ordinary Negligence Standard Is Fundamentally Unfair 
 The ªnal argument against the ordinary negligence standard for 
criminal violations of section 309(c) is that it is fundamentally unfair 
and Congress did not intend it to apply.128 Senators Domenici, In-
hofe, and Breaux, in their colloquy in support of amendment, repeat-
edly emphasize the idea that criminal liability for ordinary negligence 
under the CWA is fundamentally unfair.129 Senator Domenici refers to 
violations of the CWA’s criminal negligence provisions as “clear acci-
dents involving ordinary people.”130 Senator Inhofe states that a per-
son “entirely by accident, without any forethought and without any 
malice or intent,” could be found criminally liable under the current 
CWA, and expresses his belief that this result is “an unintended con-
sequence” of the Act.131 Accordingly, the Senators advocate amending 
the CWA to explicitly require a higher standard of negligence, similar 
to that of the CAA, which would require “risk of physical harm to the 
public” for criminal prosecution.132 Senator Inhofe expresses his be-
lief that such an amendment would constitute “a more appropriate 
provision of negligent endangerment.”133
III. United States v. Hong and the Possibility of Status 
Offenses for Negligent Violations of the CWA 
 Further concerns about criminal negligence under the CWA 
have been raised in the wake of United States v. Hong, a decision hold-
ing that responsible corporate ofªcers might be liable for their sub-
ordinates’ negligence under section 309(c) of the CWA.134 When read 
in light of Hanousek, critics have expressed concern that Hong raises 
the possibility of status offenses leading to criminal convictions: when 
a company has been ordinarily negligent, a responsible corporate 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James 
Inhofe, and John Breaux). 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (colloquy among Sens. Peter Domenici, James In-
hofe, and John Breaux). 
134 United States v. Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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ofªcer who had no part in or knowledge of the negligence might be 
successfully prosecuted.135
A. The Hong Decision 
 In United States v. Hong, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit afªrmed a lower court decision that the responsible corporate 
ofªcer doctrine applied to the CWA, meaning that a person who has 
authority to exercise control over a corporation’s activities causing 
discharges may be held liable if those discharges violate the CWA.136 
Further, the court held that, in order to be liable as a responsible cor-
porate ofªcer, an individual need not be a formally designated corpo-
rate ofªcer, but instead must be shown to bear “such a relationship to 
the corporation that it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for 
failing to prevent the charged violations of the CWA.”137
 The defendant in Hong had acquired a wastewater treatment fa-
cility in Richmond, Virginia, which was operated under the name of 
Avion Environmental Group.138 Hong was not a corporate ofªcer and 
“avoided any formal association with Avion,” but he “controlled the 
company’s ªnances and played a substantial role in company opera-
tions.”139 Along with Avion’s general manager, Hong began to investi-
gate possible wastewater treatment systems for the facility.140  Avion 
then purchased a treatment system component that Hong speciªcally 
had been told was intended to be used only as the ªnal step in treat-
ing wastewater, and not as an independent treatment system.141 Ap-
parently disregarding this information, Avion used the component as 
its only means of wastewater treatment.142 When the component be-
came clogged, Hong was informed of the situation and performed an 
inspection.143  No additional components were installed, and Avion 
employees began discharging wastewater directly into the Richmond 
sewer system in violation of Avion’s permit.144
                                                                                                                      
135 Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,154; see Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
136 Hong, 242 F.3d at 531; see United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
137 Hong, 242 F.3d at 531. 
138 Id. at 529. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 530. 
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 In determining that Hong was guilty of a negligent violation of 
section 309(c)(1)(A), the court applied the responsible corporate 
ofªcer doctrine, which is expressly authorized in the statute.145 Sec-
tion 309(c)(1) provides that any person who negligently violates a 
permit condition or limitation issued under the CWA, or who negli-
gently introduces into a sewer system pollutants which caused viola-
tion of permit limitations or conditions, shall be guilty of a criminally 
negligent violation of the CWA. 146  However, section 309(c)(6) ex-
pressly provides that, for the purpose of section 309(c), “the term 
‘person’ means, in addition to” the standard deªnition under the 
CWA, “any responsible corporate ofªcer.”147
 In determining whether Hong qualiªed as a corporate ofªcer, the 
court reviewed previous decisions related to the responsible corporate 
ofªcer doctrine.148  In United States v. Dotterweich, the Supreme Court 
held that the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine applied to “all who 
had ‘a responsible share’ in the criminal conduct.”149 In United States v. 
Park, the Court further held that a “responsible share” in criminal con-
duct could be shown by evidence that “defendant had, by reason of his 
position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to pre-
vent in the ªrst instance, or promptly to correct, the violation com-
plained of, and that he failed to do so.”150 A case in the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Iverson, speciªcally held that 
under the CWA a responsible corporate ofªcer was any person who 
“has authority to exercise control over the corporation’s activity that is 
causing the discharges,” regardless of whether that person in fact exer-
cised such control.151
 Applying this precedent to the case at hand, the Hong court con-
cluded that, although he was not a formally designated corporate 
ofªcer, Hong met the deªnition of a corporate ofªcer under the re-
sponsible corporate ofªcer doctrine.152  In doing so, the court form 
ulated the rule that “the pertinent question is whether the defendant 
bore such a relationship to the corporation that it is appropriate to 
hold him criminally liable for failing to prevent the charged violations 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. at 530–31 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2000)). 
146 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). 
147 Id. § 1319(c)(6). 
148 See Hong, 242 F.3d at 531. 
149 Id. (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943)). 
150 Id. (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673–74 (1975)). 
151 Id. (quoting United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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of the CWA.”153 Because Hong controlled corporate operations, was 
involved in the problems with the treatment system, and was aware of 
its problems but did nothing to remedy them, he could be considered 
to have a responsible share in the criminal conduct, and could thus 
be held liable under the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine.154
B. Criticism of Hong 
 Hong has been criticized primarily because the application of the 
responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine in criminal negligence cases 
raises the possibility of prosecution for “status offenses.”155 That is, 
defendants successfully could be prosecuted “not for a proscribed act 
or failure to act, but in the accused’s having a ‘certain personal condi-
tion or being a person of a speciªed character.’”156 The responsible 
corporate ofªcer doctrine raises this particular problem in the 
speciªc context of ordinary negligence, rather than in the context of 
a heightened standard of negligence such as criminal negligence.157 
In the case of the heightened criminal negligence standard, a corpo-
rate ofªcer must have “knowledge of the facts plus the authority to 
take action that would prevent a violation” in order to be held liable 
for negligence under the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine.158  
Because criminal liability can be established by a showing of ordinary 
negligence under Hanousek, this raises questions about the applica-
tion of the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine in CWA criminal 
negligence cases.159 Under simple negligence, a violation can occur if 
an offender has no knowledge of the problem but has not taken rea-
sonable measures to prevent it; therefore, it is conceivable that corpo-
rate ofªcers could be held liable for a corporation’s refusal to adopt 
certain precautions, merely because they happen to be the manager 
of a corporation that has committed an environmental violation.160 
Solow and Sarachan state that, “[t]he concern is that the doctrine will 
be used to hold corporate ofªcials and managers criminally negligent 
                                                                                                                      
153 Id. 
154 Hong, 242 F.3d at 531–32. 
155 Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,154. 
156 Id. at 11,154 n.14. 
157 See id. at 11,154. 
158 Id. 
159 See Hanousek I, 176 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999); Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, 
at 11,154. 
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by virtue of their status as ofªcials and managers without regard to 
their knowledge of, or causal role in, an environmental violation.”161
 Additionally, Hong raises the possibility that non-designated cor-
porate ofªcers could be found liable for status offenses.162 That is, 
since the rule under Hong is “whether the defendant bore such a rela-
tionship to the corporation that it is appropriate to hold him crimi-
nally liable for failing to prevent the charged violations,” individuals 
are no longer able to shield themselves from criminal liability simply 
by avoiding the title of corporate ofªcer.163
 While the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine was not speciª-
cally addressed in the Senate hearing on the proposed amendment, it 
was implicitly addressed by the concerns of Senator Breaux about po-
tential criminal liability for “responsible operators” who are “unavoid-
ably exposed to potentially immeasurable criminal ªnes and, in the 
worst case scenario, jail time.”164 Senator Breaux goes on to state that 
criminal negligence provisions are often unfair, because they target 
certain industries and work contrary to the public welfare.165
IV. Arguments for a High Standard for Criminal Negligence 
Under Section 309(c) 
 Thus far, this Note has discussed several controversial cases inter-
preting the CWA section 309(c) criminal negligence provision and 
critics’ subsequent arguments regarding the appropriate standard of 
intent. This Part will argue that central to all of these arguments is the 
designation of section 309(c) as a PWS. Behind the objections to the 
ordinary negligence standard and the responsible corporate ofªcer 
doctrine is an objection to negligence under these CWA provisions 
being treated as a PWO.166 This Part will then summarize the argu-
ments against treating the section 309(c) negligence provisions as a 
PWS. 
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A. Arguments for a Higher Standard of Negligence Under Section 309(c) 
 Are Arguments Against Finding that the Negligence  
Provision of the CWA Is a PWS 
 The arguments for weakening the criminal negligence provisions 
of section 309(c) mainly relate to the issue of whether it is a PWS.167 
Justice Thomas speciªcally stated in his dissent from the denial of cer-
tiorari in Hanousek that negligent criminal violations of the CWA should 
not be considered PWOs because of the ordinariness of the activities 
that could otherwise lead to negligent violations of the CWA, and be-
cause of the seriousness of the potential consequences of violation.168 
Arguments that ordinary negligence should not be criminalized under 
the CWA are variations of this theme.169 Commentators such as White, 
as well as Senator Inhofe, argue that section 309(c) is ºawed because it 
criminalizes ordinary negligence, and section 309(c) criminalizes ordi-
nary negligence because it is considered a PWS; thus, the objection to 
the criminalization of ordinary negligence at heart is an objection to 
the designation of section 309(c) as a PWS.170
 Furthermore, the observation that the ordinary negligence stan-
dards of section 309(c) are inconsistent with the OPA because they cre-
ate increased liability for certain oil spills also hinges on the designa-
tion of section 309(c) as a PWS.171 Johnston points out that the OPA 
limits liability in spills caused by ordinary negligence, while the CWA 
provides for unlimited liability in such spills.172 Were the CWA consid-
ered not to be a PWS, however, higher standards of knowledge would 
apply, and violators would have to know that their actions violated regu-
lations in order to be held liable.173 Thus, ordinary negligence would 
not be punishable under section 309(c) at all because ordinary negli-
gence applies to situations where people act without a reasonable de-
gree of care, as opposed to reckless or knowing violations, where peo-
ple act with knowledge that they are violating regulations. 174  Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
167 See Hanousek II, 528 U.S. at 1103 (Thomas, J., dissenting);Oversight Hearing, supra 
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recklessness or “criminal negligence” would be punished equally under 
the CWA and OPA,175 while the congruence problem between the or-
dinary negligence provisions of the CWA and OPA would disappear.176
 Finally, arguments against the Hong court’s interpretation of the 
responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine also hinge on the interpretation 
of section 309(c) as a PWS because the possibility of status offenses ex-
ists only if the standard for criminal negligence under section 309(c) is 
ordinary negligence.177 Under the responsible corporate ofªcer doc-
trine, if the standard for liability is higher, a corporate ofªcer must have 
knowledge of the violation plus authority to act in order to be found 
“responsible.”178 Under ordinary negligence standards, however, there 
is the possibility that corporate ofªcers could be found “knowing” de-
spite a lack of speciªc knowledge of the violation simply because they 
failed to adopt reasonable precautions to prevent a violation.179 Indeed, 
one might argue that this was the case in Hanousek, where Hanousek 
(as supervisor) halted the previous supervisors’ practice of protecting 
the pipeline.180 Hanousek himself had no knowledge that rocks were 
on the tracks, or that the backhoe operator intended to use his back-
hoe to remove them, fracturing the pipeline; his only deliberate, know-
ing action was to cease protecting the pipeline.181 Although it was not 
framed under the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine, Hanousek’s 
offense might be likened to a status offense because he had no knowl-
edge of the speciªc events leading up to the violation; rather, he merely 
failed to take precautions for which he was responsible that would have 
prevented the violation.182
B. Summary of Arguments that Section 309(c) Should Not Be Considered a PWS 
 The real problem that opponents of section 309(c)’s current lan-
guage have with criminal negligence in the CWA, then, is that they 
believe that it has been wrongly interpreted as a PWS, and that there-
fore its reach has become too broad.183 Opponents of considering 
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section 309(c) to be a PWS believe that courts incorrectly apply PWO 
analysis to negligent activities causing CWA violations because these 
violations involve ordinary, everyday activities, such as gun ownership 
in Staples.184 They assert that ordinary negligence is simply too ordi-
nary in nature.185 Although ordinary negligence violations under the 
CWA might involve the handling of dangerous substances that the 
handler should know are regulated, as in International Minerals, negli-
gent violations of the CWA might also “impose[ ] criminal liability for 
persons using standard equipment to engage in a broad range of or-
dinary industrial and commercial activities.”186 Thus, they argue, be-
cause of the potential for negligent violations caused by standard, eve-
ryday behavior, section 309(c) should not be considered a PWS, 
following the Court’s analysis in Staples and International Minerals.187
 Furthermore, opponents argue that section 309(c) should not be a 
PWS because of the severity of the potential consequences of viola-
tions.188 Justice Thomas stated that penalties designated as PWOs are 
traditionally “relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to 
an offender’s reputation,” and that since penalties for violating the 
CWA involve imprisonment and signiªcant ªnes, section 309(c) should 
not be considered a PWS.189 Similarly, White argues that section 309(c) 
should not be considered a PWS because of the harshness of its penal-
ties, noting that ordinary negligence is not likely to be deterred by 
prison sentences because of its inherently accidental nature.190
 Thus, opponents of considering section 309(c) to be a PWS do 
not necessarily argue that section 309(c) should be eliminated, but 
rather that violations of the criminal negligence provisions should 
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require a higher standard than ordinary negligence.191 Because sec-
tion 309(c) is not a PWS, they argue, an ordinary negligence standard 
would violate due process.192 Amendments to section 309(c), then, 
are intended to combat the interpretation by the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit of section 309(c) as a PWS—by requiring a height-
ened standard of negligence, supporters of the amendment would be 
counteracting the effect of a PWS designation for section 309(c).193
V. Justiªcations for the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of a 
Lower Negligence Standard Under Section 309(c) 
 This Part will argue that section 309(c) of the CWA should be 
considered a PWS. While arguments to the contrary—summarized in 
the previous Part—are forceful, the arguments for interpreting sec-
tion 309(c) to be a PWS are still stronger. The CWA does in fact regu-
late “deleterious devices”—pollutants in our nation’s waters—and the 
primary aim of the CWA is to protect the public welfare.194 Moreover, 
arguments against treating section 309(c) as a PWS are incorrect in 
asserting that PWS status allows section 309(c) to criminalize “clear 
accidents.”195 If the proposed amendment were adopted, the resulting 
gaps in the CWA would allow severe environmental harms to go un-
punished.196 Finally, in looking at the history of negligence prosecu-
tions under the CWA, it is clear that prosecutors have not abused the 
standards of section 309(c) to punish mere accidents.197
A. Arguments in Weitzenhoff and Hanousek for Interpreting Section 
309(c) as a PWS: The CWA Regulates “Deleterious Devices” in  
Pursuit of the Public Welfare 
 The reasoning of the Weitzenhoff and Hanousek courts justiªes in-
terpreting criminal negligence under the CWA as a PWS because of the 
nature of the activities regulated, and because of the potential conse-
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quences of such violations to public welfare.198 In Weitzenhoff, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that because the CWA regulated 
“deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste material” whose 
very nature as such puts the violator on notice that his activities are 
likely to be heavily regulated, knowing violations under section 309(c) 
were PWOs.199 In this case, the objects regulated by the CWA are poten-
tially harmful pollutants discharged into the public water supply.200 The 
court reasoned that pollutants regulated by the CWA are more like the 
harmful chemicals in International Minerals than like the guns regulated 
in Staples, the common ownership of which in the United States serves 
to counteract any notice that the average citizen might have that own-
ing an unregistered gun is against the law.201
 In addition to the nature of the substance regulated, the Weitzen-
hoff court pointed to the potential consequences of violation as an-
other reason that criminal violations of section 309(c) should be con-
sidered PWOs. 202  The court noted that, like statutes regulating 
“discharge of pollutants into the air, the disposal of hazardous waste, 
the undocumented shipping of acids, and the use of pesticides on our 
food”—all of which had been determined to be PWSs—the pollution 
of water caused by violations of the CWA could result in a variety of 
serious illnesses to members of the public at large. 203  Since “the 
criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to protect the 
public at large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollu-
tion,” they constitute public welfare offenses.204
 In reasoning that criminal violations of section 309(c) are PWOs, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed the argument later advanced by Justice 
Thomas that the PWO doctrine should apply only to offenses whose 
penalties or damage to reputation was negligible.205 They noted that 
that may have been true in the past but that “modern statutes now 
punish public welfare offenses with much more signiªcant terms of 
imprisonment,” including several felonies. 206  Although Staples ex-
                                                                                                                      
198 Hanousek I, 176 F.3d at 1121–22; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286. 
199 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286. 
200 Id. 
201 See id. at 1285–86. 
202 Id. at 1286. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 See Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286 n.7. 
206 Id. 
670 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:643 
pressed concern with this trend, it stopped short of holding that 
PWOs may not be punished as felonies.207
 Weitzenhoff thus determined the rule for the Ninth Circuit that 
criminal violations of section 309(c) are PWOs.208 Weitzenhoff involved 
a knowing violation of the CWA; thus, the designation of PWO was 
not explicitly extended to negligent violations of section 309(c) until 
Hanousek.209 The court in Hanousek rejected the defendant’s attempt 
to distinguish Weitzenhoff and argue that negligent violations of section 
309(c) were not PWOs.210 The court noted that Balint, Morissette, and 
Dotterweich indicated that ordinary negligence may be considered a 
PWO without violating due process.211 Furthermore, it noted that the 
material regulated in Hanousek (heating oil) was a “dangerous device,” 
and that the very existence of the oil pipeline should have put Ha-
nousek on notice that his activities related to it were likely regu-
lated.212 Given that Weitzenhoff had established that criminal violations 
(and implicitly criminally negligent violations) of section 309(c) were 
PWOs, and given that previous Supreme Court cases permitted ªnd-
ing negligent violations to be PWOs, the court in Hanousek concluded 
that the criminal negligence provisions of section 309(c) were PWSs, 
notwithstanding defendant’s due process rights.213
B. Holding Violations of Section 309(c) to Be PWOs Does Not Mean  
that “Simple Accidents” Will Be Punished, nor Does It  
Increase the Likelihood of Status Offenses 
 Many of the arguments against considering negligent violations 
of section 309(c) to be PWOs focus on the ordinary negligence stan-
dard and assert that it is so low that innocent individuals conducting 
routine activities will accidentally violate the CWA and be subject to 
criminal liability.214 This is not the case because, to meet the standard 
of ordinary negligence, violators must somehow fail to exercise rea-
sonable care. 215  In her testimony at the Senate hearing, Professor 
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Robin Greenwald points out that any spill or discharge that is truly an 
accident will not be punishable under the current CWA, even though 
it is a PWO.216 It is only when a person “fail[s] to exercise the care 
that a reasonable person would have taken under similar circum-
stances” that that person would be liable for violating section 309(c); 
thus, some degree of violator culpability is always required, and no 
pure accidents can create liability under the CWA.217 Greenwald fur-
ther points out that neither the conduct in Hanousek nor that in Hong 
was a true accident: in both cases there was a failure to exercise rea-
sonable care.218 In Hanousek, the defendant stopped taking precau-
tionary measures to protect the pipeline that the project manager be-
fore him had taken, while in Hong the defendant authorized the 
installation of a system that he had been informed would be inade-
quate for treating wastewater on its own, and was aware of the dis-
charge of wastewater into the sewer system.219 Thus, violators in CWA 
negligence cases do have some degree of mental culpability under the 
ordinary negligence standard, in that they failed to take reasonable 
measures under the circumstances.220
 Moreover, the concern that a manager could be held liable un-
der the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine for ordinary negli-
gence does not imply that status offenses will occur.221 If a manager is 
held liable, it will not be a manager who is entirely innocent.222 Under 
the responsible corporate ofªcer doctrine, as articulated in Hong, a 
corporate ofªcer must have “responsibility and authority . . . to pre-
vent . . . the violation” in order to be eligible for liability.223 Under 
ordinary negligence, the manager or employees that were under his 
authority must have failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care.224 
Thus, a manager who is exercising reasonable care in supervising em-
ployees’ activities will not be guilty of a violation: only a manager who 
fails to exercise such care will have committed a violation.225
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C. If the Standard of Harm to Humans Is Inserted into Section 309(c), Some 
Grave Environmental Harms Would Not Be Punishable Under the CWA 
 In his statement at the Senate hearing, Senator Inhofe suggested 
that, if the standard for negligent criminal violations of section 309(c) 
could be amended, one model might be the criminal negligence pro-
visions of the CAA, which provide for liability where negligence re-
sults in human endangerment.226 Opponents of amending the CWA 
argue that this human endangerment standard is problematic for two 
main reasons: it allows several types of grave environmental harms to 
go unpunished, and gives government prosecutors less ºexibility in 
bargaining with corporate defendants to arrange for cleanups of envi-
ronmental disasters.227
 Were the standard for liability in CWA criminal negligence cases 
to be amended to necessitate human endangerment, major environ-
mental disasters involving gross negligence or recklessness would not 
be punishable under the CWA.228 For example, Greenwald pointed 
out at the hearing that under the proposed standard the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Alaska would not have been eligible for prosecution 
under the CWA. 229  This case involved negligence on the part of 
Exxon, which allowed a captain with a history of alcohol abuse to 
navigate an oil tanker in Prince William Sound, off the coast of 
Alaska.230 Eleven million tons of oil were spilled, and harm to the en-
vironment was devastating: according to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Trustee Council, at least thirty “resources or species” were injured by 
the spill, many of which had been considered to be still “not recover-
ing” ten years later.231 The defendant eventually pled guilty, and an 
agreement to pay millions for cleanup was reached because of the 
specter of liability under the negligence provisions of the CWA.232 Be-
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cause only Alaska’s wildlife and natural environment were harmed, 
and no human was injured or put at risk of death or serious bodily 
injury, the proposed amendments would dictate that the CWA would 
not have applied in that case.233 The Exxon Valdez is not the only ex-
ample: Greenwald references Colonial Pipeline, where a corporation 
decided to over-pressure a pipeline, knowing that it was much more 
likely to burst, causing a spill into a river; and Solow and Sarachan cite 
to a case where one hundred tons of ªsh were killed in the White 
River in Indiana.234 Amending the criminal negligence provisions of 
section 309(c) so that they are applicable only in cases where humans 
are harmed or endangered would leave a gap in the nation’s envi-
ronmental regulation, making it proªtable for corporations to engage 
in reckless behavior that might result in spills so long as it is not likely 
that those spills will affect human health.235
D. The History of Prosecutions Under the Negligence Provision of Section 
309(c) Shows that It Has Not Been Abused and Is an  
Important Prosecutorial Tool 
 Opponents of the amendment also argue that history shows that 
there is no need for an amendment because prosecution under the 
negligence provisions of the CWA has been directed against cases of 
serious environmental harm or gross negligence—or used as a nego-
tiation tool in plea-bargaining.236 Changing the standard for criminal 
negligence under the CWA will not change the types of cases that are 
being prosecuted.237 Rather, it will serve only to weaken prosecutors’ 
bargaining power.238
 In their statistical analysis of criminal negligence prosecutions 
under the CWA, Solow and Sarachan ªnd that CWA negligence 
prosecutions fall into four categories: 
  (1) extraordinary environmental harm or human injuries; 
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  (2) very serious harm and gross negligence; 
  (3) “compromise” cases, in which negligence charges serve 
as a means to reach a plea agreement; and 
  (4) “combination” cases, in which negligence charges are 
combined with felony charges under environmental stat-
utes and/or traditional Title 18 criminal charges.239
In order to be prosecuted for a CWA negligence violation alone, cases 
have traditionally involved either human harm or gross negligence.240 
Thus, it has not held true that corporate defendants are being at-
tacked for status offenses, or that individuals are being prosecuted for 
“accidents” resulting from daily activities.241 This restraint is not due 
merely to prosecutorial discretion, but also to institutional policies 
within investigating agencies, which prioritize cases involving signiª-
cant environmental harm or placing humans in danger of death or 
serious bodily injury.242 Moreover, agencies such as EPA and the Coast 
Guard require that harm be coupled with “culpable conduct,” which 
includes factors such as intent, history of violations, deliberate behav-
ior, and efforts to conceal the violation.243 Because of the number of 
agencies involved in investigating environmental crimes and the re-
luctance to change in both investigatory and prosecutorial policies, 
Solow and Sarachan assert that these norms of prosecution are un-
likely to change rapidly in the future.244
 Solow and Sarachan further point out that Hanousek and Hong do 
not deviate signiªcantly from the model of cases traditionally prose-
cuted under the CWA’s negligence provisions.245 In Hong, the defen-
dant personally was involved in decisions not to remedy the violations 
of which he was aware, resulting in gross negligence; therefore, a case 
could have been made for a knowing violation.246 In Hanousek, the 
CWA charges were combined with charges of obstruction of justice 
and destruction of evidence when the defendant attempted to hide 
evidence of the spill’s magnitude from the government, and thus the 
CWA charges were part of a larger prosecution for more serious 
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crimes.247 Thus, Hanousek and Hong may represent relatively standard 
CWA prosecutions, conforming to past standards and practices, and 
do not raise alarm or call for a change in the current standard.248
 While an amendment to section 309(c) may not drastically 
change the type of straight negligence cases that are prosecuted, it 
may serve to change the frequency of cases where section 309(c) is 
used as a plea-bargaining tool, giving prosecutors less ºexibility and 
perhaps resulting in actually harsher consequences for environmental 
violators.249 For example, Greenwald argues that cases such as Hong 
would have to be prosecuted under the “knowing” provision if the 
negligence standard were altered, and believes they might actually be 
successfully prosecuted that way.250 In this way, for some defendants 
the amendment would have the opposite of its intended effect—
forcing harsher punishment for borderline offenders. 
Conclusion 
 The current language of the CWA’s section 309(c) negligence 
standard should remain unchanged, and courts that have interpreted it 
as a public welfare statute have done so correctly. The CWA ªts the tra-
ditional deªnition of a PWS—the pollutants regulated by the CWA are 
noxious and deleterious devices—and that is why they have been des-
ignated as pollutants under the CWA.251 Furthermore, serious pollut-
ants that could cause signiªcant harm are not ordinarily handled in 
everyday life—few Americans deal with possible sources of pollutants 
such as oil pipelines on an everyday basis, and those who do should be 
required to exercise an appropriately higher degree of care.252 Finally, 
those who are dealing with potential pollutants should be aware that 
they are strictly regulated. Anyone working near an oil pipeline can 
reasonably be expected to know that oil spills are potentially hazardous, 
that the transport and treatment of such a potentially dangerous sub-
stance is heavily regulated, and that they should act accordingly.253
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 The one aspect of criminal violations of the CWA that does not ªt 
the PWO mold is the possible punishment.254 While it is true that, his-
torically, PWOs do not involve the possibility of heavy penalties, this is 
not a bright-line rule, nor a deªning characteristic of PWOs.255 The 
Court in Staples speciªcally did not hold that PWOs had to have light 
penalties, but only that this was something that the courts should con-
sider in determining whether a statute is a PWS.256 Furthermore, as 
the court in Weitzenhoff noted, some statutes that have been deter-
mined to be PWSs do carry heavy penalties, such as the statute regu-
lating the transport of acids in International Minerals.257
 An ordinary negligence standard is also appropriate not only be-
cause criminal violations of the CWA ªt the deªnition of a PWO, but 
also because the negligence punished by the CWA does not encom-
pass spills that occur because of mere “accidents,” as its critics sug-
gest.258 In order to violate the criminal negligence provisions of the 
CWA, an individual must fail to exercise a reasonable degree of 
care.259 When dealing with dangerous pollutants, it is entirely appro-
priate that individuals be expected to be careful, and not to create a 
situation in which “accidents” are unreasonably likely to happen. 
 A standard requiring human endangerment would fail to ade-
quately achieve the objectives of the CWA because it would not capture 
all the possible environmental harms that could occur by negligent vio-
lations of the CWA.260 Some harms to the environment can be tremen-
dously damaging without endangering humans, such as the Exxon Val-
dez oil spill.261 Furthermore, a standard requiring more than ordinary 
negligence might make it proªtable or allowable in some instances for 
corporations to pollute—as long as a corporation does not cause hu-
man endangerment, it can engage in risky, negligent behavior that 
might lead to accidents that harm only wildlife or plants.262
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 An amendment like that proposed to change section 309(c) 
would likely have the further undesirable effect of handicapping 
prosecutors in plea-bargaining.263 History shows that the CWA crimi-
nal provisions have not been used to prosecute accidental or mini-
mally negligent conduct.264 Moreover, agency protocol limits the pos-
sibility that the CWA will be abused by overzealous prosecutors in the 
near future.265 Weakening the negligence provision of section 309(c) 
could handicap prosecutors for no reason by taking away a powerful 
bargaining tool that has not yet been abused.266
 Thus, because section 309(c) ªts the deªnition of public welfare 
legislation, because it is reasonable to require care when one is deal-
ing with pollutants, and because changing the standard of negligence 
would fail to address certain environmental harms and would handi-
cap prosecutors in plea-bargaining, violations of section 309(c) 
should be considered PWOs, and the current negligence language 
should remain in place. 
                                                                                                                      
263 See id. (statement of Prof. Robin Greenwald); Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 
11,158–59. 
264 See Solow & Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,160–61. 
265 See id. at 11,160. 
266 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Robin Greenwald); Solow & 
Sarachan, supra note 6, at 11,158–59. 
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